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Abstract
We study adversarial examples in a black-box setting where
the adversary only has API access to the target model and
each query is expensive. Prior work on black-box adversarial
examples follows one of two main strategies: (1) transfer at-
tacks use white-box attacks on local models to find candidate
adversarial examples that transfer to the target model, and (2)
optimization-based attacks use queries to the target model and
apply optimization techniques to search for adversarial exam-
ples. We propose hybrid attacks that combine both strategies,
using candidate adversarial examples from local models as
starting points for optimization-based attacks and using labels
learned in optimization-based attacks to tune local models for
finding transfer candidates. We empirically demonstrate on
the MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets that our hybrid
attack strategy reduces cost and improves success rates. We
also introduce a seed prioritization strategy which enables
attackers to focus their resources on the most promising seeds.
Combining hybrid attacks with our seed prioritization strat-
egy enables batch attacks that can reliably find adversarial
examples with only a handful of queries.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) models are often prone to misclas-
sifying inputs, known as adversarial examples (AEs), that
are crafted by perturbing a normal input in a constrained,
but purposeful way. Effective methods for finding adversarial
examples have been found in white-box settings, where an ad-
versary has full access to the target model [8,17,24,32,39], as
well as in black-box settings, where only API access is avail-
able [10, 21, 22, 36, 38, 43]. In this work, we aim to improve
our understanding of the expected cost of black-box attacks in
realistic settings. For most scenarios where the target model
is only available through an API, the cost of attacks can be
quantified by the number of model queries needed to find a
desired number of adversarial examples. Black-box attacks
often require a large number of model queries, and each query
takes time to execute, in addition to incurring a service charge
and exposure risk to the attacker.
Previous black-box attacks can be grouped into two cat-
egories: transfer attacks [35, 36] and optimization attacks
[10, 21, 22, 38, 43]. Transfer attacks exploit the observation
that adversarial examples often transfer between different
models [17, 27, 29, 36, 41]. The attacker generates adversar-
ial examples against local models using white-box attacks,
and hopes they transfer to the target model. Transfer attacks
use one query to the target model for each attempted candi-
date transfer, but suffer from transfer loss as local adversarial
examples may not successfully transfer to the target model.
Transfer loss can be very high, especially for targeted attacks
where the attacker’s goal requires finding examples where
the model outputs a particular target class rather than just
producing misclassifications.
Optimization attacks formulate the attack goal as a black-
box optimization problem and carry out the attack using a
series of queries to the target model [1, 4,10, 18,21, 22,28, 33,
43]. These attacks require many queries, but do not suffer from
transfer loss as each seed is attacked interactively using the
target model. Optimization-based attacks can have high attack
success rates, even for targeted attacks, but often require many
queries for each adversarial example found.
Contributions. Although improving query efficiency and at-
tack success rates for black-box attacks is an active area of
research for both transfer-based and optimization-based at-
tacks, prior works treat the two types of attacks independently
and fail to explore possible connections between the two ap-
proaches. We investigate three straightforward possibilities
for combining transfer and optimization-based attacks (Sec-
tion 3), and find that only one is generally useful (Section 4):
failed transfer candidates are useful starting points for opti-
mization attacks. This can be used to substantially improve
black-box attacks in terms of both success rates and, most
importantly, query cost. Compared to transfer attacks, hybrid
attacks can significantly improve the attack success rate by
adopting optimization attacks for the non-transfers, which
increases per-sample query cost. Compared to optimization
attacks, hybrid attacks significantly reduce query complexity
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when useful local models are available. For example, for both
MNIST and CIFAR10, our hybrid attacks reduce the mean
query cost of attacking normally-trained models by over 75%
compared to state-of-the-art optimization attacks. For Image-
Net, the transfer attack only has 3.4% success rate while the
hybrid attack approaches 100% success rate.
To improve our understanding of resource-limited black-
box attacks, we simulate a batch attack scenario where the
attacker has access to a large pool of seeds and is motivated to
obtain many adversarial examples using limited resources. Al-
ternatively, we can view the batch attacker’s goal as obtaining
a fixed number of adversarial examples with fewest queries.
We demonstrate that the hybrid attack can be combined with
a novel seed prioritization strategy to dramatically reduce the
number of queries required in batch attacks (Section 5). For
example, for ImageNet, when the attacker is interested in ob-
taining 10 adversarial examples from a pool of 100 candidate
seeds, our seed prioritization strategy can be used to save over
70% of the queries compared to random ordering of the seeds.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we overview the two main types of black-box
attacks which are combined in our hybrid attack strategies.
2.1 Transfer Attacks
Transfer attacks take advantage of the observation that ad-
versarial examples often transfer across models. The attacker
runs standard white-box attacks on local models to find ad-
versarial examples that are expected to transfer to the tar-
get model. Most works assume the attacker has access to
similar training data to the data used for the target model,
or has access to pretrained models for similar data distribu-
tion. For attackers with access to pretrained local models, no
queries are needed to the target model to train the local mod-
els. Other works consider training a local model by querying
the target model, sometimes referred to as substitute train-
ing [27, 36]. With naïve substitute training, many queries are
needed to train a useful local model. Papernot et al. adopt a
reservoir sampling approach to reduce the number of queries
needed [36]. Li et al. use active learning to further reduce
the query cost [27]. However, even with these improvements,
many queries are still needed and substitute training has had
limited effectiveness for complex target models.
Although adversarial examples sometimes transfer between
models, transfer attacks typically have much lower success
rates than optimization attacks, especially for targeted attacks.
In our experiments on ImageNet, the highest transfer rate of
targeted attacks observed from a single local model is 0.2%,
while gradient-based attacks achieve nearly 100% success.
Liu et al. improve transfer rates by using an ensemble of local
models [29], but still only achieve low transfer rates (3.4% in
our ImageNet experiments, see Table 3).
Another line of work aims to improve transferability by
modifying the white-box attacks on the local models. Dong et
al. adopt the momentum method to boost the attack process
and leads to improved transferability [15]. Xie et al. improve
the diversity of attack inputs by considering image transfor-
mations in the attack process to improve transferability of
existing white-box attacks [45]. Dong et al. recently proposed
a translation invariant optimization method that further im-
proves transferability [16]. We did not incorporate these meth-
ods in our experiments, but expect they would be compatible
with our hybrid attacks.
2.2 Optimization Attacks
Optimization-based attacks work by defining an objective
function and iteratively perturbing the input to optimize that
objective function. We first consider optimization attacks
where the query response includes full prediction scores, and
categorize those ones that involve estimating the gradient of
the objective function using queries to the target model, and
those that do not depend on estimating gradients. Finally, we
also briefly review restricted black-box attacks, where attack-
ers obtain even less information from each model query, in the
extreme, learning just the label prediction for the test input.
Gradient Attacks. Gradient-based black-box attacks numer-
ically estimate the gradient of the target model, and execute
standard white-box attacks using those estimated gradients.
Table 1 compares several gradient black-box attacks.
The first attack of this type was the ZOO (zeroth-order
optimization) attack, introduced by Chen et al. [10]. It adopts
the finite-difference method with dimension-wise estimation
to approximate gradient values, and uses them to execute a
Carlini-Wagner (CW) white-box attack [8]. The attack runs
for hundreds to thousands of iterations and takes 2D queries
per CW optimization iteration, where D is the dimensionality.
Hence, the query cost is extremely high for larger images (e.g.,
over 2M queries on average for ImageNet).
Following this work, several researchers have sought more
query-efficient methods for estimating gradients for executing
black-box gradient attacks. Bhagoji et al. propose reducing
query cost of dimension-wise estimation by randomly group-
ing features or estimating gradients along with the principal
components given by principal component analysis (PCA) [4].
Tu et al.’s AutoZOOM attack uses two-point estimation based
on random vectors and reduces the query complexity per CW
iteration from 2D to 2 without losing much accuracy on es-
timated gradients [43]. Ilyas et al.’s NES attack [21] uses a
natural evolution strategy (which is in essence still random
vector-based gradient estimation) [44], to estimate the gradi-
ents for use in projected gradient descent (PGD) attacks [32].
Ilyas et al.’s BanditsTD attack incorporates time and data
dependent information into the NES attack [22]. Al-Dujaili et
al.’s SignHunter adopts a divide-and-conquer approach to es-
timate the sign of the gradient and is empirically shown to be
superior to the BanditsTD attack in terms of query efficiency
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Attack Gradient Estimation Queries per Iteration White-box Attack
ZOO [10] gˆ = {gˆi, gˆ2, ..., gˆD}, gˆi ≈ f (x+δei)− f (x−δei)δ 2D CW [8]
Bhagoji et. al [4] ZOO + random feature group or PCA ≤ 2D FGSM [17], PGD [32]
AutoZOOM [43] ui ∼ U, gˆ = 1N
∑N
i
f (x+δui)− f (x)
δ ui N + 1 CW [8]
NES [21] ui ∼ N(0, I), gˆ = 1N
∑N
i
f (x+δui)
δ ui N PGD
BanditsTD [22] NES + time/data dependent info N PGD
SignHunter [1] Gradient sign w/ divide-and-conquer method 2dlog(D)+1e PGD
Cheng et al. [13] ui ∼ U, gˆ = 1N
∑N
i (
√
λ ·v + √1−λ · (I−vvT )ui||(I−vvT )ui ||2 ) N PGD
Table 1: Gradient attacks. These attacks use some method to estimate gradients and then leverage white-box attacks. D is data
dimension, ei denotes standard basis, N is the number of gradient averages. f (x) denotes prediction confidence of image x: for
targeted attacks, it denotes the confidence of target class; for untargeted attacks, it denotes the confidence of original class. δ is a
small constant. v is the local model gradient. λ is a constant controlling the strength of local and target model gradients.
Attack Applicable Norm Objective Function Solution Method
Sim-BA [18] L2,L∞ min
x′
f (x′) Iterate: sample q from Q, first try q, then −q
NAttack [28] L2,L∞ min
θ
∫
l(x′)pi(x′|θ)dx′ Compute θ∗, then sample from pi(x′ | θ∗)
Moon et al. [43] L∞ maxS⊆V
f (x + 
∑
i∈S ei− ∑i<S ei) Compute S∗, then x + ∑i∈S∗ ei− ∑i<S∗ ei
Table 2: Gradient-free attacks. These attacks define an objective function and obtain the AE by solving the optimization problem.
Q denotes a set of orthonormal candidate vectors, l(x′) denotes the cross-entropy loss of image x′ with original label (untargeted
attack) or target label (targeted attack). pi(x′|θ) denotes the distribution of x′ parameterized by θ,V denotes ground set of all
pixel locations. Variables with ∗ are locally-optimal solutions obtained by solving the corresponding optimization problems.
and attack success rate [1]. Cheng et al. recently proposed im-
proving the BanditsTD attack by incorporating gradients from
surrogate models as priors when estimating the gradients [13].
For our experiments (Section 4.2), we use AutoZOOM and
NES as representative state-of-the-art black-box attacks.1
Gradient-free Attacks. Researchers have also explored
search-based black-box attacks using heuristic methods that
are not based on gradients, which we call gradient-free at-
tacks. One line of work directly applies known heuristic
black-box optimization techniques, and is not competitive
with the gradient-based black-box attacks in terms of query
efficiency. Alzantot et al. [2] develop a genetic programming
strategy, where the fitness function is defined similarly to CW
loss [8], using the prediction scores from queries to the black-
1We also tested BanditsTD on ImageNet, but found it less competitive to
the earlier attacks and therefore, do not include the results in this paper. We
have not evaluated SignHunter and the attack of Cheng et al. [13], but plan to
include more results in the future versions and have released an open-source
framework to enable other attacks to be tested using our methods.
box model. A similar genetic programming strategy was used
to perform targeted black-box attacks on audio systems [40].
Narodytska et al. [34] use a local neighbor search strategy,
where each iteration perturbs the most significant pixel. Since
the reported query efficiency of these methods is not com-
petitive with results for gradient-based attacks, we did not
consider these attacks in our experiments.
Several recent gradient-free black-box attacks (summarized
in Table 2) have been proposed that can significantly outper-
form the gradient-based attacks. Guo et al.’s Sim-BA [18]
iteratively adds or subtracts a random vector sampled from
a predefined set of orthonormal candidate vectors to gener-
ate adversarial examples efficiently. Li et al.’s NAttack [28]
formulates the adversarial example search process as identi-
fying a probability distribution from which random samples
are likely to be adversarial. Moon et al. formulate the L∞-
norm black-box attack with  perturbation as a problem of
selecting a set of pixels with + perturbation and applying
the − perturbation to the remaining pixels, such that the ob-
3
jective function defined for misclassification becomes a set
maximization problem. Efficient submodular optimization
algorithms are then used to solve the set maximization prob-
lem efficiently [33]. These attacks became available after we
started our experiments, so are not included in our experi-
ments. However, our hybrid attack strategy is likely to work
for these new attacks as it boosts the optimization attacks by
providing better starting points, which we expect is beneficial
for most attack algorithms.
Restricted Black-box Attacks. All the previous attacks as-
sume the adversary can obtain complete prediction scores
from the black-box model. Much less information might be
revealed at each model query, however, such as just the top
few confidence scores or, at worst, just the output label.
Ilyas et al. [21], in addition to their main results of NES at-
tack with full prediction scores, also consider scenarios where
prediction scores of the top-k classes or only the model predic-
tion label are revealed. In the case of partial prediction scores,
attackers start from an instance in the target class (or class
other than the original class) and gradually move towards the
original image with the estimated gradient from NES. For the
label-only setting, a surrogate loss function is defined to uti-
lize the strategy of partial prediction scores. Brendel et al. [5]
propose a label-only black-box attack, which starts from an
example in the target class and performs a random walk from
that target example to the seed example. This random walk
procedure often requires many queries. Following this work,
several researchers have worked to reduce the high query cost
of random walk strategies. Cheng et al. formulate a label-only
attack as an optimization problem, reducing the query cost
significantly compared to the random walk [12]. Chen et al.
also formulate the label-only attack as an optimization prob-
lem and show this significantly improves query efficiency [9].
Brunner et al. [6] improve upon the random walk strategy
by additionally considering domain knowledge of image fre-
quency, region masks and gradients from surrogate models.
In our experiments, we assume attackers have access to full
prediction scores, but we believe our methods are also likely
to help in settings where attackers obtain less information
from each query. This is because the hybrid attack boosts
gradient attacks by providing better starting points and is
independent from the specific attack methods or the types of
query feedback from the black-box model.
3 Hybrid Attacks
Our hybrid attacks combine the transfer and optimization
methods for searching for adversarial examples. Here, we
introduce the threat model of our attack, state the hypothe-
ses underlying the attacks, and presents the general hybrid
attack algorithm. We evaluate the hypotheses and attacks in
Section 4.
Threat Model. In the black-box attack setting, the adversary
does not have direct access to the target model or knowledge
of its parameters, but can use API access to the target model
to obtain prediction confidence scores for a limited number
of submitted queries. We assume the adversary has access
to pretrained local models for the same task as the target
model. These could be directly available or produced from
access to similar training data and knowledge of the model
architecture of the target model. The assumption of having
access to pretrained local models is a common assumption for
research on transfer-based attacks. A few works on substitute
training [27, 36] have used weaker assumptions such as only
having access to a small amount of training data, but have
only been effective so far for very small datasets.
Hypotheses. Our approach stems from three hypotheses
about the nature of adversarial examples:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Local adversarial examples are better
starting points for optimization attacks than original seeds.
Liu et al. observe that for the same classification tasks, dif-
ferent models tend to have similar decision boundaries [29].
Therefore, we hypothesize that, although candidate adversar-
ial examples generated on local models may not fully transfer
to the target model, these candidates are still closer to the
targeted region than the original seed and hence, make better
starting points for optimization attacks.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Labels learned from optimization attacks
can be used to tune local models. Papernot et al. observe that
generating examples crossing decision boundaries of local
models can produce useful examples for training local models
closer to the target model [36]. Therefore, we hypothesize
that query results generated through the optimization search
queries may contain richer information regarding true target
decision boundaries. These new labeled inputs that are the by-
product of an optimization attack can then be used to fine-tune
the local models to improve their transferability.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Local models can help direct gradient
search. Since different models tend to have similar decision
boundaries for the same classification tasks, we hypothesize
that gradient information obtained from local models may
also help better calibrate the estimated gradient of gradient
based black-box attacks on target model.
We are not able to find any evidence to support the third hy-
pothesis (H3), which is consistent with Liu et al.’s results [29].
They observed that, for ImageNet models, the gradients of
local and target models are almost orthogonal to each other.
We also tested this for MNIST and CIFAR10, conducting
white-box attacks on local models and storing the intermedi-
ate images and the corresponding gradients. We found that
the local and target models have almost orthogonal gradients
(cosine similarity close to zero) and therefore, a naïve combi-
nation of gradients of local and target model is not feasible.
One possible explanation is the noisy nature of gradients of
deep learning models, which causes the gradient to be highly
sensitive to small variations [3]. Although the cosine similar-
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input :Set of seed images X with labels,
local model ensemble F,
target black-box model g
output :Set of successful adversarial examples
1 R← X (remaining seeds to attack)
2 A← ∅ (successful adversarial examples)
3 Q← X (fine-tuning set for local models)
4 while R is not empty do
5 select and remove the next seed to attack
6 x← selectSeed(R,F)
7 use local models to find a candidate adversarial
example
8 x′← whiteBoxAttack(F,x)
9 x?, S ← blackBoxAttack(x,x′,g)
10 if x? then
11 A.insert(< x, x? >)
12 end
13 Q.insert(S)
14 use byproduct labels to retrain local models
15 tuneModels(F,Q)
16 end
17 return A
Algorithm 1: Hybrid Attack.
ity is low, two recent works have attempted to combine the
local gradients and the estimated gradient of the black-box
model by a linear combination [6,13]. However, Brunner et al.
observe that straightforward incorporation of local gradients
does not improve targeted attack efficiency much [6]. Cheng
et al. successfully incorporated local gradients into untargeted
black-box attacks, however, they do not consider the more
challenging targeted attack scenario and it is still unclear if
local gradients can help in more challenging cases [6]. Hence,
we do not investigate this further in this paper and leave it
as an open question if there are more sophisticated ways to
exploit local model gradients.
Attack Method. Our hybrid attacks combine transfer and
optimization attacks in two ways based on the first two hy-
potheses: we use a local ensemble to select better starting
points for an optimization attack, and use the labeled inputs
obtained in the optimization attack to tune the local models
to improve transferability. Algorithm 1 provides a general
description of the attack. The attack begins with a set of seed
images X, which are natural images that are correctly clas-
sified by the target model, and a set of local models, F. The
attacker’s goal is to find a set of successful adversarial exam-
ples (satisfying some attacker goal, such as being classified in
a target class with a limited perturbation below starting from
a natural image in the source class).
The attack proceeds by selecting the next seed to attack
(line 6). Section 4 considers the case where the attacker only
selects seeds randomly; Section 5 considers ways more so-
phisticated resource-constrained attackers may improve effi-
ciency by prioritizing seeds. Next, the attack uses the local
models to find a candidate adversarial example for that seed.
When the local adversarial example is found, we first check
its transferability and if the seed directly transfers, we proceed
to attack the next seed. If the seed fails to directly transfer,
the black-box optimization attack is then executed starting
from that candidate. The original seed is also passed into the
black-box attack (line 9) since the adversarial search space is
defined in terms of the original seed x, not the starting point
found using the local models, x′. This is because the space of
permissible inputs is defined based on distance from the orig-
inal seed, which is a natural image. Constraining with respect
to the space of original seed is important because we need to
make sure the perturbations from our method are still visually
indistinguishable from the natural image. If the black-box
attack succeeds, it returns a successful adversarial example,
x?, which is added to the returned set. Regardless of success,
the black-box attack produces input-label pairs (S ) during the
search process which can be used to tune the local models
(line 15), as described in Section 4.6.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report on experiments to validate our hy-
pothesis, and evaluate the hybrid attack methods. Section 4.1
describes the experimental setup; Section 4.2 describes the at-
tack configuration; Section 4.3 describes the attack goal; Sec-
tion 4.4 reports on experiments to test the first hypothesis from
Section 3 and measure the effectiveness of hybrid attacks; Sec-
tion 4.5 improves the attack for targeting robust models, and
Section 4.6 evaluates the second hypothesis, showing the im-
pact of tuning the local models using the label byproducts.
For all of these, we focus on comparing the cost of the attack
measured as the average number of queries needed per adver-
sarial example found across a set of seeds. In Section 5, we
revisit the overall attack costs in light of batch attacks that
can prioritize which seeds to attack.
4.1 Datasets and Models
We evaluate our attacks on three popular image classification
datasets and a variety of state-of-the-art models.
MNIST. MNIST [25] is a dataset of 70,000 28×28 greyscale
images of handwritten digits (0–9), split into 60,000 training
and 10,000 testing samples. For our normal (not adversari-
ally trained) MNIST models, we use the pretrained MNIST
models of Bhagoji et al. [4], which typically consist of con-
volutional layers and fully connected layers. We use their
MNIST model A as the target model, and models B–D as
local ensemble models. To consider the more challenging sce-
nario of attacking a black-box robust model, we use Madry’s
robust MNIST model, which demonstrates strong robustness
even against the best white-box attacks (maintaining over 88%
accuracy for L∞ attacks with  = 0.3) [32].
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CIFAR10. CIFAR10 [23] consists of 60,000 32× 32 RGB
images, with 50,000 training and 10,000 testing samples for
object classification (10 classes in total). We train a stan-
dard DenseNet model and obtain a test accuracy of 93.1%,
which is close to state-of-the-art performance. To test the ef-
fectiveness of our attack on robust models, we use Madry’s
CIFAR10 Robust Model [32]. Similarly, we also use the nor-
mal CIFAR10 target model and the standard DenseNet (Std-
DenseNet) model interchangeably. For our normal local mod-
els, we adopt three simple LeNet structures [26], varying the
number of hidden layers and hidden units.2 For simplicity,
we name the three normal models NA, NB and NC where
NA has the fewest parameters and NC has the most parame-
ters. To deal with the lower effectiveness of attacks on robust
CIFAR10 model (Section 4.4), we also adversarially train
two deep CIFAR10 models (DenseNet, ResNet) similar to the
Madry robust model as robust local models. The adversarially-
trained DenseNet and ResNet models are named R-DenseNet
and R-ResNet.
ImageNet. ImageNet [14] is a dataset closer to real-world
images with 1000 categories, commonly used for evaluating
state-of-the-art deep learning models. We adopt the following
pretrained ImageNet models for our experiments: ResNet-
50 [19], DenseNet [20], VGG-16, and VGG-19 [37] (all from
https://keras.io/applications/). We take DenseNet as the target
black-box model and the remaining models as the local en-
semble.
4.2 Attack Configuration
For the hybrid attack, since we have both the target model
and local model, we have two main design choices: (1) which
white-box attacks to use for the local models , and (2) which
optimization attacks to use for the target model.
Local Model Configurations. We choose an ensemble of
local models in our hybrid attacks. This design choice is
motivated by two facts: First, different models tend to have
significantly different direct transfer rates to the same target
model (see Figure 1), when evaluated individually. Therefore,
taking an ensemble of several models helps avoid ending
up with a single local model with a very low direct transfer
rate. Second, consistent with the findings of Liu et al. [29]
on attacking an ensemble of local models, for MNIST and
CIFAR10, we find that the ensemble of normal local mod-
els yields the highest transfer rates when the target model
is a normally trained model (note that this does not hold for
robust target model, as shown in Figure 1 and discussed fur-
ther in Section 4.5). We validate the importance of normal
local ensemble against normal target model by considering
different combinations of local models (i.e.,
(
N
k
)
,k = 1, ...,N)
2We also tested with deep CNN models as our local ensembles. However,
they provide only slightly better performance compared to simple CIFAR10
models, while the fine-tuning cost is much higher.
and checking their corresponding transfer rates and the av-
erage query cost. We adopt the same approach as proposed
by Liu et al. [29] to attack multiple models simultaneously,
where the attack loss is defined as the sum of the individual
model loss. In terms of transfer rate, we observe that a single
CIFAR10 or MNIST normal model can achieve up to 53%
and 35% targeted transfer rate respectively, while an ensem-
ble of local models can achieve over 63% and 60% transfer
rate. In terms of the average query cost against normal target
models, compared to a single model, an ensemble of local
models on MNIST and CIFAR10 can save on average 53%
and 45% of queries, respectively. Since the ensemble of nor-
mal local models provides the highest transfer rate against
normal target models, to be consistent, we use that configu-
ration in all our experiments attacking normal models. We
perform white-box PGD [32] attacks (100 iterative steps) on
the ensemble loss. We choose the PGD attack as it gives a
high transfer rate compared to the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) method [17].
Optimization Attacks. We use two state-of-the-art gradient
estimation based attacks in our experiments: NES, a natu-
ral evolution strategy based attack [21] and AutoZOOM, an
autoencoder-based zeroth-order optimization attack [43] (see
Section 2.2). These two methods are selected as all of them are
shown to improve upon [10] significantly in terms of query
efficiency and attack success rate. We also tested with the
BanditsTD attack, an improved version of the NES attack that
additionally incorporates time and data dependent informa-
tion [22]. However, we find that BanditsTD is not competitive
with the other two attacks in our attack scenario and therefore
we do not include its results here.3 Both tested attacks follow
an attack method that attempts queries for a given seed un-
til either a successful adversarial example is found or the set
maximum query limit is reached, in which case they terminate
with a failure. For MNIST and CIFAR10, we set the query
limit to be 4000 queries for each seed. AutoZOOM sets the
default maximum query limit for each as 2000, however as we
consider a harder attacker scenario (selecting least likely class
as the target class), we decide to double the maximum query
limit. NES does not contain evaluation setups for MNIST
and CIFAR10 and therefore, we choose to enforce the same
maximum query limit as AutoZOOM.4 For ImageNet, we
set the maximum query limit as 10,000 following the default
setting used in the NES paper [21].
4.3 Attacker Goal
For MNIST and CIFAR10, we randomly select 100 images
from each of the 10 classes for 1000 total images, against
3For example, for the targeted attack on ImageNet, the baseline BanditsTD
attack only has 88% success rate and average query cost of 51,745, which
are much worse than the NES and AutoZOOM attacks.
4By running the original AutoZOOM attack with a 4000 query limit
compared to their default setting of 2000, we found 17.2% and 25.4% more
adversarial samples out of 1000 seeds for CIFAR10 and MNIST respectively.
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Dataset Target Transfer Gradient Success (%) Queries/Seed Queries/AE Queries/SearchModel Rate (%) Attack Base Ours Base Ours Base Ours Base Ours
MNIST
Normal (T) 62.8 AutoZOOM 91.3 98.9 1,471 279 1,610 282 3,248 770NES 77.5 89.2 2,544 892 3,284 1,000 8,254 3,376
Robust (U) 3.1 AutoZOOM 7.5 7.5 3,755 3,748 50,102 49,776 83,042 83,806NES 4.7 5.5 3,901 3,817 83,881 69,275 164,302 160,625
CIFAR10
Normal (T) 63.6 AutoZOOM 92.9 98.2 1,117 271 1,203 276 2,143 781NES 98.8 99.8 1,078 339 1,091 340 1,632 934
Robust (U) 10.1 AutoZOOM 64.3 65.3 1,692 1,652 2,632 2,532 3,117 2,997NES 38.1 38.0 2,808 2,779 7,371 7,317 9,932 9,977
ImageNet Normal (T) 3.4 AutoZOOM 95.4 98.0 42,310 29,484 44,354 30,089 45,166 31,174NES 100.0 100.0 18,797 14,430 18,797 14,430 19,030 14,939
Table 3: Impact of starting from local adversarial examples (Hypothesis 1). Baseline attacks that start from the original seeds are
Base; the hybrid attacks that start from local adversarial examples are Ours. The attacks against the normal models are targeted
(T), and against the robust models are untargeted (U). The Transfer Rate is the direct transfer rate for local adversarial examples.
The Success rate is the fraction of seeds for which an adversarial example is found. The Queries/Seed is the average number of
queries per seed, regardless of success. The Queries/AE is the average number of queries per successful adversarial example
found, which is our primary metric. The Queries/Search is the average number of queries per successful AE found using the
gradient attack, excluding those found by direct transfer. Transfer attacks are independent from the subsequent gradient attacks
and hence, transfer rates are separated from the specific gradient attacks. All results are averaged over 5 runs.
which we perform all black-box attacks. For ImageNet, we
randomly sample 100 total images across all 1000 classes.
Target Class. We evaluate targeted attacks on the normal
MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet models. Targeted attacks
are more challenging and are generally of more practical
interest. For the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, all of the
selected instances belong to one particular original class and
we select as the target class the least likely class of the original
class given a prediction model, which should be the most
challenging class to target. We define the least likely class of
a class as the class which is most frequently the class with
the lowest predicted probability across all instances of the
class. For ImageNet, we choose the least likely class of each
image as the target class. For the robust models for MNIST
and CIFAR10, we evaluate untargeted attacks as these models
are designed to resist untargeted attacks [30, 31]. Untargeted
attacks against these models are significantly more difficult
than targeted attacks against the normal models.
Attack Distance Metric and Magnitude. We measure the
perturbation distance using L∞, which is the most widely
used attacker strength metric in black-box adversarial exam-
ples research. Since the AutoZOOM attack is designed for
L2 attacks, we transform it into an L∞ attack by clipping the
attacked image into the -ball (L∞ space) of the original seed
in each optimization iteration. Note that the original Auto-
ZOOM loss function is defined as f (x) + c ·δ(x), where f (x)
is for misclassification (targeted or untargeted) and δ(x) is for
perturbation magnitude minimization. In our transformation
to L∞-norm, we only optimize f (x) and clip the to L∞-ball of
the original seed. NES is naturally an L∞ attack. For MNIST,
we choose  = 0.3 following the setting in Bhagoji et al. [4].
For CIFAR10, we set  = 0.05, following the same setting
in early version of NES paper [21]. For ImageNet, we set
 = 0.05, as used by Ilyas et al. [21].
4.4 Local Candidates Results
We test the hypothesis that local models produce useful can-
didates for black-box attacks by measuring the mean cost to
find an adversarial example starting from both the original
seed and from a candidate found using the local ensemble. All
experiments are averaged over 5 runs to obtain more stable
results. Table 3 summarizes our results.
In nearly all cases, the cost is reduced by starting from the
candidates instead of the original seeds, where candidates are
generated by attacking local ensemble models. We measure
the cost by the mean number of queries to the target model
per adversarial example found. This is computed by dividing
the total number of model queries used over the full attack
on 1,000 (MNIST, CIFAR10) or 100 (ImageNet) seeds by the
number of successful adversarial examples found. The overall
cost is reduced by as much as 81% (AutoZOOM attack on the
normal MNIST model), and for both the AutoZOOM and for
NES attack methods we see the cost drops by at least one third
for all of the attacks on normal models (the improvements
for robust models are not significant, which we return to in
Section 4.5). The cost drops for two reasons: some candidates
transfer directly (which makes the query cost for that seed 1);
others do not transfer directly but are useful starting points
for the gradient attacks. To further distinguish the two factors,
we include the mean query cost for adversarial examples
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Target Model Transfer Rate (%) Gradient Hybrid Success (%) Cost Reduction (%) Fraction Better (%)
Normal-3 Robust-2 Attack Normal-3 Robust-2 Normal-3 Robust-2 Normal-3 Robust-2
Normal 63.6 18.4 AutoZOOM 98.2 95.3 77.1 35.7 98.6 87.0NES 99.8 99.4 68.9 31.2 95.6 80.6
Robust 10.1 40.7 AutoZOOM 65.3 68.7 3.8 20.5 73.1 95.5NES 38.0 45.2 0.7 32.1 85.0 97.1
Table 4: Attack performance of all normal and all robust local ensembles on CIFAR10 target models. The Normal-3 ensemble
is composed of the three normal models, NA, NB, and NC; the Robust-2 ensemble is composed of R-DenseNet and R-ResNet.
Results are averaged over 5 runs. Local model transfer rates are independent from the black-box attacks, so we separate transfer
rate results from the black-box attack results.
found from non-transfering seeds as the last two columns in
Table 3. This reduction is significant for all the attacks across
the normal models, up to 76% (AutoZOOM attack on normal
MNIST models).
The hybrid attack also offers success rates higher than the
gradient attacks (and much higher success rates that transfer-
only attacks), but with query cost reduced because of the
directly transferable examples and boosting effect on gradient
attacks from non-transferable examples. For the AutoZOOM
and NES attacks on normally-trained MNIST models, the
attack failure rates drop dramatically (from 8.7% to 1.1% for
AutoZOOM, and from 22.5% to 10.8% for NES), as does
the mean query cost (from 1,610 to 282 for AutoZOOM, and
from 3,284 to 1,000 for NES). Even excluding the direct
transfers, the saving in queries is significant (from 3,248 to
770 for AutoZOOM, and from 8,254 to 3,376 for NES). The
candidate starting points are nearly always better than the
original seed. For the two attacks on MNIST, there were only
at most 28 seeds out of 1,000 where the original seed was
a better starting point than the candidate; the worst result is
for the AutoZOOM attack against the robust CIFAR10 model
where 269 out of 1,000 of the local candidates are worse
starting points than the corresponding original seed.
4.5 Attacking Robust Models
The results in Table 3 show substantial improvements from
hybrid attacks on normal models, but fail to provide improve-
ments against the robust models. The improvements against
robust models are less than 4% for both attacks on both tar-
gets, except for NES against MNIST where there is ∼17%
improvement. We speculate that this is due to differences in
the vulnerability space between normal and robust models,
which means that the candidate adversarial examples found
against the normal models in the local ensemble do not pro-
vide useful starting points for attacks against a robust model.
This is consistent with Tsipras et al.’s finding that robust
models for image classification tasks capture key features
of images while normal models capture relatively noisy fea-
tures [42]. Because of the differences in extracted features,
adversarial examples against robust models require perturbing
key features (of the target domain) while adversarial examples
can be found against normal models by perturbing irrelevant
features. This would explain why we did not see improve-
ments from the hybrid attack when targeting robust models.
To validate our hypothesis on the different attack surfaces,
we repeat the experiments on attacking the CIFAR10 robust
model but replace the normal local models with robust local
models, which are adversarially trained DenseNet and ResNet
models mentioned in Section 4.1.5
Table 4 compares the direct transfer rates for adversarial
example candidates found using ensembles of normal and
robust models against both types of target models. We see
that using robust models in the local ensemble increases the
direct transfer rate against the robust model from 10.1% to
40.7% (while reducing the transfer rate against the normal
target model). We also find that the candidate adversarial
examples found using robust local models also provide better
starting points for gradient black-box attacks. For example,
with the AutoZOOM attack, the mean cost reduction with
respect to the baseline mean query (2,632) is significantly
improved (from 3.8% to 20.5%). We also observe a significant
increase of fraction better (percentages of seeds that starting
from the local adversarial example is better than starting from
the original seed) from 73.1% to 95.5%, and a slight increase
in the overall success rate of the hybrid attack (from 65.3%
to 68.7%). When an ensemble of robust local models is used
to attack normal target models, however, the attack efficiency
degrades significantly, supporting our hypothesis that robust
and normal models have different attack surfaces.
Universal Local Ensemble. The results above validate our
hypothesis that the different attack surfaces of robust and
normal models cause the ineffectiveness against the robust
CIFAR10 model in Table 3. Therefore, to achieve better per-
formance, depending on the target model type, the attacker
should selectively choose the local models. However, in prac-
tice, attackers may not know if the target model is robustly
trained, so cannot predetermine the best local models. We
5We did not repeat the experiments with robust MNIST local models
because, without worrying about separately training robust local models, we
can simply improve the attack performance significantly by tuning the local
models during the hybrid attack process (see Table 6 in Section 4.6). The
tuning process transforms the normal local models into more robust ones
(details in Section 4.6).
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Figure 1: Transfer Rates of Different Local Ensembles. The Normal-3 ensemble is composed of the three normal models, NA, NB,
and NC; the Robust-2 ensemble is composed of R-DenseNet and R-ResNet. The All-5 is composed of all of the 5 local models.
Transfer rate is measured on independently sampled test images and is averaged over 5 runs.
next explore if a universal local model ensemble exists that
works well for both normal and robust target models.
To look for the best local ensemble, we tried all 31 different
combinations of the 5 local models (3 normal and 2 robust)
and measured their corresponding direct transfer rates against
both normal and robust target models. Figure 1 reports the
transfer rates for each local ensemble against both normal
and robust target models. For clarity in presentation, we only
include results for the five individual models and four rep-
resentative ensembles in the figure: an ensemble of NA-NB
(selected to represent the mediocre case); Robust-2, an en-
semble of the two robust models (R-DenseNet and R-ResNet);
Normal-3, an ensemble of three normal models (NA, NB, and
NC); and All-5, an ensemble of all five local models. These
include the ensembles that have the highest or lowest trans-
fer rates to the target models and transfer rates of all other
ensembles fit between the reported highest and lowest values.
None of the ensembles we tested had high direct transfer
rates against both normal and robust target models. Ensem-
bles with good performance against robust targets have poor
performance against normal targets (e.g., Robust-2 has 37.8%
transfer rate to robust target, but 18.1% to normal target), and
ensembles that have good performance against normal targets
are bad against robust targets (e.g., Normal-3 has 65.6% trans-
fer rate to the normal target, but only 9.4% to the robust target).
Some ensembles are mediocre against both (e.g., NA-NB).
One possible reason for the failure of ensembles to apply
to both types of target, is that when white-box attacks are
applied on the mixed ensembles, the attacks still “focus” on
the normal models as normal models are easier to attack (i.e.,
to significantly decrease the loss function). Biasing towards
normal models makes the candidate adversarial example less
likely to transfer to a robust target model. This conjecture is
supported by the observation that although the mixtures of
normal and robust models mostly fail against robust target
models, they still have reasonable transfer rates to normal
target models (e.g., ensemble of 5 local models has 63.5%
transfer rate to normal CIFAR10 target model while only
9.5% transfer rate to the robust target model). It might be
interesting to explore if one can explicitly enforce the attack
to focus more on the robust model when attacking the mixture
of normal and robust models.
In practice, attackers can dynamically adapt their local
ensemble based on observed results, trying different local en-
sembles against a particular target for the first set of attempts
and measuring their transfer rate, and then selecting the one
that worked best for future attacks. This simulation process
adds overhead and complexity to the attack, but may still be
worthwhile when the transfer success rates vary so much for
different local ensembles.
For our subsequent experiments on CIFAR10 models, we
use the Normal-3 and Robust-2 ensembles as these give the
highest transfer rates to normal and robust target models.
4.6 Local Model Tuning
To test the hypothesis that the labels learned from optimization
attacks can be used to tune local models, we measure the
impact of tuning on the local models’ transfer rate.
During black-box gradient attacks, there are two different
types of input-label pairs generated. One type is produced
by adding small magnitudes of random noise to the current
image to estimate target model gradients. The other type is
generated by perturbing the current image in the direction of
estimated gradients. We only use the latter input-label pairs
as they contain richer information about the target model
boundary since the perturbed image moves towards the de-
cision boundary. These by-products of the black-box attack
search can be used to retrain the local models (line 15 in Al-
gorithm 1). The newly generated image and label pairs are
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Model Gradient Attack Transfer Rate (%)
Static Tuned
MNIST Normal (T) AutoZOOM 60.6 64.4NES 60.6 77.9
MNIST Robust (U) AutoZOOM 3.4 4.3NES 3.4 4.5
CIFAR10 Normal (T) AutoZOOM 65.6 8.6NES 65.6 33.4
CIFAR10 Robust (U) AutoZOOM 9.4 8.8NES 9.4 9.3
Table 5: Impact of Tuning Local Models on Local Model
Transfer Rate (Baseline + H2): gradient attacks start from
original seed. Transfer rate is measured on independently
sampled test images and is averaged over 5 runs.
added to the original training set to form the new training
set, and the local models are fine-tuned on the new training
set. As more images are attacked, the training set size can
quickly explode. To avoid this, when the size of new training
set exceeds a certain threshold c, we randomly sample c of the
training data and conduct fine-tuning using the sampled train-
ing set. For MNIST and CIFAR10, we set the threshold c as
the standard training data size (60,000 for MNIST and 50,000
for CIFAR10). At the beginning of hybrid attack, the training
set consists of the original seeds available to the attacker with
their ground-truth labels (i.e., 1,000 seeds for MNIST and
CIFAR10 shown in Section 4.2).
Algorithm 1 shows the local model being updated after ev-
ery seed, but considering the computational cost required for
tuning, we only update the model periodically. For MNIST,
we update the model after every 50 seeds; for CIFAR10, we
update after 100 seeds (we were not able to conduct the tuning
experiments for the ImageNet models because of the high cost
of each attack and of retraining). To check the transferability
of the tuned local models, we independently sample 100 un-
seen images from each of the 10 classes, use the local model
ensemble to find candidate adversarial examples, and test the
candidate adversarial examples on the black-box target model
to measure the transfer rate.
We first test whether the local model can be fine-tuned by
the label by-products of baseline gradient attacks (Baseline
attack + H2) by checking the transfer rate of local models
before and after the fine-tuning process. We then test whether
attack efficiency of hybrid attack can be boosted by fine-tuning
local models during the attack process (Baseline attack + H1
+ H2) by reporting their average query cost and attack success
rate. The first experiment helps us to check applicability of
H2 without worrying about possible interactions between H2
with other hypotheses. The second experiment evaluates how
much attackers can benefit from fine-tuning the local models
in combination with hybrid attacks.
We report the results of the first experiment in Table 5. For
the MNIST model, we observe increases in the transfer rate
of local models by fine-tuning using the byproducts of both
attack methods—the transfer rate increases from 60.6% to
77.9% for NES, and from 60.6% to 64.4% for AutoZOOM.
Even against the robust MNIST models, the transfer rate im-
proves from the initial value of 3.4% to 4.3% (AutoZOOM)
and 4.5% (NES). However, for CIFAR10 dataset, we observe a
significant decrease in transfer rate. For the normal CIFAR10
target model, the original transfer rate is as high as 65.6%,
but with fine-tuning, the transfer rate decrease significantly
(decreased to 8.6% and 33.4% for AutoZOOM and NES re-
spectively). A similar trend is also observed for the robust
CIFAR10 target model. These results suggest that the exam-
ples used in the attacks are less useful as training examples
for the CIFAR10 model than the original training set.
Our second experiment, reported in Table 6, combines the
model tuning with the hybrid attack. Through our experi-
ments, we observe that for MNIST models, the transfer rate
also increases significantly by fine-tuning the local models.
For the MNIST normal models, the (targeted) transfer rate
increases from the original 60.6% to 74.7% and 76.9% for
AutoZOOM and NES, respectively. The improved transfer
rate is also higher than the results reported in first experiment.
For the AutoZOOM attack, in the first experiment, the trans-
fer rate can only be improved from 60.6% to 64.4% while in
the second experiment, it is improved from 60.6% to 76.9%.
Therefore, there might be some boosting effects by taking lo-
cal AEs as starting points for gradient attacks. For the Madry
robust model on MNIST, the low (untargeted) transfer rate
improves by a relatively large amount, from the original 3.4%
to 5.1% for AutoZOOM and 4.8% for NES (still a low trans-
fer rate, but a 41% relative improvement over the original
local model). The local models become more robust during
the fine-tuning process. For example, with the NES attack,
the local model attack success rate (attack success is defined
as compromising all the local models) decreases significantly
from the original 96.6% to 25.2%, which indicates the tuned
local models are more resistant to the PGD attack. The im-
provements in transferability, obtained as a free by-product of
the gradient attack, also lead to substantial cost reductions for
the attack on MNIST, as seen in Table 6. For example, for the
AutoZOOM attack on the MNIST normal model, the mean
query cost is reduced by 31%, from 282 to 194 and the attack
success rate is also increased slightly, from 98.9% for static
local models to 99.5% for tuned local models. We observe
similar patterns for robust MNIST model and demonstrate
that Hypothesis 2 also holds on the MNIST dataset.
However, for CIFAR10, we still find no benefits from the
tuning. Indeed, the transfer rate decreases, reducing both the
attack success rate and increasing its mean query cost (Ta-
ble 6). We do not have a clear understanding of the reasons
the CIFAR10 tuning fails, but speculate it is related to the
difficulty of training CIFAR10 models. The results returned
from gradient-based attacks are highly similar to a particular
seed and may not be diverse enough to train effective local
models. This is consistent with Carlini et al.’s findings that
MNIST models tend to learn well from outliers (e.g., unnat-
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Model Gradient Queries/AE Success Rate (%) Transfer Rate (%)Attack Static Tuned Static Tuned Static Tuned
MNIST Normal (T) AutoZOOM 282 194 98.9 99.5 60.6 74.7NES 1,000 671 89.2 92.2 60.6 76.9
MNIST Robust (U) AutoZOOM 49,776 42,755 7.5 8.6 3.4 5.1NES 69,275 51,429 5.5 7.3 3.4 4.8
CIFAR10 Normal (T) AutoZOOM 276 459 98.2 96.3 65.6 19.7NES 340 427 99.8 99.6 65.6 40.7
CIFAR10 Robust (U) AutoZOOM 2,532 2,564 65.3 64.9 9.4 10.1NES 7,317 7,303 38.0 37.6 9.4 10.7
Table 6: Impact of Tuning Local Models (averaged 5 times). Transfer rate is measured on independently sampled test images.
ural images) whereas more realistic datasets like CIFAR10
tend to learn well from more prototypical (e.g., natural) exam-
ples [7]. Therefore, fine-tuning CIFAR10 models using label
by-products, which are more likely to be outliers, may dimin-
ish learning effectiveness. Potential solutions to this problem
include tuning the local model with mixture of normal seeds
and attack by-products. One may also consider keeping some
fraction of model ensembles fixed during the fine-tuning pro-
cess such that when by-products mislead the tuning process,
these fixed models can mitigate the problem. We leave further
exploration of this for future work.
5 Batch Attacks
Section 4 evaluates attacks assuming an attacker wants to
attack every seed from some fixed set of initial seeds. In more
realistic attack scenarios, each query to the model has some
cost or risk to the attacker, and the attacker’s goal is to find as
many adversarial examples as possible using a limited total
number of queries. Carlini et al. show that, defenders can iden-
tify purposeful queries for adversarial examples based on past
queries and therefore, detection risk will increase significantly
when many queries are made [11]. We call these attack sce-
narios batch attacks. To be efficient in these resource-limited
settings, attackers should prioritize “easy-to-attack” seeds.
A seed prioritization strategy can easily be incorporated
into the hybrid attack algorithm by defining the selectSeed
function used in step 6 in Algorithm 1 to return the most
promising seed:
argmin
x∈X
EstimatedAttackCost(x,F).
To clearly present the hybrid attack strategy in the batch
setting, we present a two-phase strategy: in the first phase,
local model information is utilized to find likely-to-transfer
seeds; in the second phase, target model information is used to
select candidates for optimization attacks. This split reduces
the generality of the attack, but simplifies our presentation
and analysis. Since direct transfers have such low cost (that is,
one query when they succeed) compared to the optimization
attacks, constraining the attack to try all the transfer candi-
dates first does not compromise efficiency. More advanced
attacks might attempt multiple transfer attempts per seed, in
which case the decision may be less clear when to switch to
an optimization attack. We do not consider such attacks here.
5.1 First Phase: Transfer Attack
Since the first phase seeks to find direct transfers, it needs to
execute without any information from the target model. The
goal is to order the seeds by likelihood of finding a direct
transfer before any query is done to the model. As before, we
do assume the attacker has access to pretrained local models,
so can use those models both to find candidates for transfer
attacks and to prioritize the seeds.
Within the transfer attack phase, we use a prioritization
strategy based on the number of PGD-Steps of the local mod-
els to predict the transfer likelihood of each image. We ex-
plored using other metrics based on local model information
such as local model attack loss and local prediction score gap
(difference in the prediction confidence of highest and second
highest class), but did not find significant differences in the
prioritization performance compared to PGD-Step. Hence,
we only present results using PGD-Steps here.
Prioritizing based on PGD Steps. We surmised that the eas-
ier it is to find an adversarial example against the local models
for a seed, the more likely that seed has a large vulnerability
region in the target model. One way to measure this difficult
is the number of PGD steps used to find a successful local
adversarial example and we prioritize seeds that require less
number of PGD steps. To be more specific, we first group
images by their number of successfully attacked local models
(e.g., k out of K local models), and then prioritize images in
each group based on their number of PGD steps used to find
the adversarial examples that compromises the k local models.
We prioritize adversarial examples that succeed against more
of the local models (i.e., larger value of k) with the assump-
tion that adversarial examples succeed on more local models
tend to have higher chance to transfer to the “unknown” tar-
get model. Above prioritization strategy is the combination
of the metrics of number of successfully compromised local
models and PGD steps. We also independently tested the im-
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(a) Local Normal-3 Ensemble: NA, NB, NC (b) Local Robust-2 Ensemble: R-DenseNet, R-ResNet
Figure 2: First phase (transfer only) attack prioritization (untargeted attack on robust CIFAR10 model, average over 5 runs).
Solid line denotes the mean value and shaded area denotes the 95% confidence interval.
Local Ensemble Metric First AE Top 1% Top 2% Top 5%
Normal-3
Local PGD Step 1.4±0.5 20.4±2.1 54.2±5.6 218.2±28.1
Random 11.4±0.5 100.8±4.9 199.6±9.7 496.6±24.2
Robust-2
Local PGD Step 1.0±0.0 11.8±0.4 25.6±0.9 63.8±0.8
Random 4.0±0.0 26.0±0.0 50.4±0.5 124.2±1.3
Table 7: Impact of prioritization for first phase (robust CIFAR10 Model, average over 5 runs).
pact of each of the two metrics, and found that the PGD-step
based metrics perform better than the number of successfully
attacked models, and our current metric of combining the num-
ber of PGD steps and the number of successfully attacked
models is more stable compared to just using the PGD steps.
Results. Our prioritization strategy in the first phase sorts
images and each seed is queried once to obtain direct transfers.
We compare with the baseline of random selection of seeds
where the attacker queries each seed once in random order to
show the advantage of prioritizing seeds based on PGD-Steps.
Figure 2 shows the results of untargeted attack on the
Madry robust CIFAR10 model for both normal and robust lo-
cal model ensembles. Note that first phase attack only checks
transferability of the candidate adversarial examples and is
independent from the black-box optimization attacks. All re-
sults are averaged over five runs. In all cases, we observe
that, checking transferability with prioritized order in the first
phase is significantly better than checking the transferability
in random order. More quantitative information is given in
Table 7. For the untargeted attack on robust CIFAR10 model
with the three normal local models (NA, NB, NC), when at-
tacker is interested in obtaining 1% of the total 1,000 seeds,
checking transferability with prioritized order reduces the cost
substantially—with prioritization, it takes 20.4 queries on av-
erage, compared to 100.8 with random order. We observed
similar patterns for other datasets and models.
5.2 Second Phase: Optimization Attacks
The transfer attack used in the first phase is query efficient,
but has low success rate. Hence, when it does not find enough
adversarial examples, the attack continues by attempting the
optimization attacks on the remaining images. In this section,
we show that the cost of the optimization attacks on these
images varies substantially, and then evaluate prioritization
strategies to identify low-cost seeds.
Query Cost Variance of Non-transfers. Figure 3 shows the
query distributions of non-transferable images for MNIST,
CIFAR10 and ImageNet using the NES attack starting from lo-
cal adversarial examples (similar patterns are observed for the
AutoZOOM attack). For ImageNet, when images are sorted
by query cost, the top 10% of 97 images (excluding 3 direct
transfers and 0 failed adversarial examples from the original
100 images) only takes on average 1,522 queries while the
mean query cost of all 100 images is 14,828. So, an attacker
interested in obtaining only 10% of the total 100 seeds us-
ing this prioritization reduces their cost by 90% compared to
targeting seeds randomly. For CIFAR10, the impact is even
higher, reducing the mean query cost for obtaining adversarial
examples for 10% of the seeds remaining after the transfer
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(a) MNIST and CIFAR10 (b) ImageNet
Figure 3: Query cost of NES attack on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet models. We exclude direct transfers (successfully
attacked during first phase) and seeds for which no adversarial example was found within the query limit (4000 for MNIST and
CIFAR; 10,000 for ImageNet). All the target models are normal models with NES targeted attacks.
phase by approximately 95% (from 933 to 51) over the ran-
dom ordering.
Prioritization Strategies. These results show the potential
cost savings from prioritizing seeds in batch attacks, but to
be able to exploit the variance we need a way to identify low-
cost seeds in advance. We consider two different strategies
for estimating the attack cost to implement the estimator for
the EstimatedAttackCost function. The first uses same local
information as adopted in the first phase: low-cost seeds tend
to have lower PGD steps in the local attacks. The drawback of
prioritizing all seeds only based on local model information is
that local models may not produce useful estimates of the cost
of attacking the target model. Hence, our second prioritization
strategy uses information obtained from the single query to
the target model that is made for each seed in the first phase.
This query results in obtaining a target model prediction score
for each seed, which we use to prioritize the remaining seeds
in the second phase. Specifically, we find that low-cost seeds
tend to have lower loss function values, defined with respect
to the target model. The assumption that an input with a lower
loss function value is closer to the attacker’s goal is the same
assumption that forms the basis of the optimization attacks.
Taking a targeted attack as an example, we compute the
loss similarly to the loss function used in AutoZOOM [43].
For a given input x and target class t, the loss is calculated as
l(x, t) = (maxi,t log f (x)i− log f (x)t)+
where f (x) denotes the prediction score distribution of a seed.
So, f (x)i is the model’s prediction of the probability that x
is in class i. Similarly, for an untargeted attack with orig-
inal label y, the loss is defined as l(x,y) = max(log f (x)y −
maxi,y log f (x)i)+. Here, the input x is the candidate starting
point for an optimization attack. Thus, for hybrid attacks that
start from a local candidate adversarial example, z′, of the
original seed z, attack loss is computed with respect to z′ in-
stead of z. For the baseline attack that starts from the original
seed z, the loss is computed with respect to z.
Results. We evaluate the prioritization for the second phase
using the same experimental setup as in Section 5.1. We
compare the two prioritization strategies (based on local PGD
steps and the target model loss) to random ordering of seeds
to evaluate their effectiveness in identifying low-cost seeds.
The baseline attacks (AutoZOOM and NES, starting from the
original seeds) do not have a first phase transfer stage, so we
defer the comparison results to next subsection, which shows
performance of the combined two-phase attack.
Figure 4 shows the results for untargeted AutoZOOM at-
tacks on the robust CIFAR10 model for local ensembles of
both normal and robust models (results for the NES attack
are not shown, but exhibit similar patterns). Using the target
loss information estimates the attack cost better than the lo-
cal PGD step ordering, while both prioritization strategies
achieve much better performance than the random ordering.
Table 8 summarizes the results. For example, for the untar-
geted AutoZOOM attack on robust CIFAR10 model with the
Normal-3 local ensemble, an attacker who wants to obtain
ten new adversarial examples (in addition to the 101 direct
transfers found in the first phase) can find them using on
average 1,248 queries using target model loss in the second
phase, compared to 3,465 queries when using only local en-
semble information, and 26,336 without any prioritization
(using random ordering).
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(a) Normal-3 Local Ensemble (b) Robust-2 Local Ensemble
Figure 4: Impact of seed prioritization strategies in the second phase (AutoZOOM untargeted attack on robust CIFAR10 model,
average over 5 runs). The x-axis denotes the query budget and the y-axis denotes the number of successful adversarial examples
found with the given query budget. The maximum query budget is the sum of the query cost for attacking all seed images (i.e.,
the total number of queries used to attack all 1000 seeds for CIFAR10 models) — 1,656,818 for the attack with normal local
models, and 1,444,980 for the attack with robust local models. The second phase starts at 1000 queries and the number of direct
transfers found because it begins after checking the direct transfers in the first phase.
Local Ensemble Metric Additional 1% Additional 2% Additional 5% Additional 10%
Normal-3
Target Loss 1,248±93 1,560±147 2,739±118 6,229±336
Local PGD Step 3,465±266 4,982±274 29,203±4,450 51,962±5,117
Random 26,336±3,486 58,247±3,240 150,060±3,415 301,635±6,651
Robust-2
Target Loss 2,086±37 3,900±604 9,882±2,051 29,435±2,418
Local PGD Step 6,009±834 10,875±1,391 28,625±3,148 75,002±5,663
Random 49,410±1,596 99,900±3,261 258,278±2,136 512,398±6,606
Table 8: Impact of different prioritization strategies for optimization attacks (AutoZOOM untargeted attack on robust CIFAR10
model, average over 5 runs). For different models, their number of direct transfers varies—for Normal-3 there are in average
101.2, for Robust-2 there are in average 407.4. We report the number of queries needed to find an additional x% (10, 20, 50, and
100 out of 1000 total seeds), using the remaining seeds after the first phase.
5.3 Overall Attack Comparison
To further validate effectiveness of the seed prioritized two-
phase strategy, we evaluate the full attack combining both
phases. Based on our analysis in the previous subsections, we
use the best prioritization strategies for each phase: PGD-Step
in the first phase and target loss value in the second phase. For
the baseline attack, we simply adopt the target loss value to
prioritize seeds. We evaluate the effectiveness in comparison
with two degenerate strategies:
• retroactive optimal — this strategy is not realizable, but
provides an upper bound for the seed prioritization. It as-
sumes the attackers have prior knowledge of the true rank
of each seed. That is, we assume a selectSeed function
that always returns the best remaining seed.
• random — the attacker selects candidate seeds in a ran-
dom order and conducts optimization attacks exhaustively
(until either success or the query limit is reached) on each
seed before trying the next one. This represents traditional
black-box attacks that just attack every seed.
Here, we only present results of AutoZOOM attack on
robust CIFAR10 model with normal local models and Auto-
ZOOM attack on ImageNet models. The attack on robust
CIFAR10 is the setting where the performance gain for the
hybrid attack is least significant compared to other models
(see Table 3), so this represents the most challenging scenario
for our attack. In the ImageNet setting, the performance of
the target loss based prioritization is not a significant improve-
ment over random scheduling, so this represents the worst
case for target loss prioritization for the baseline attack. Re-
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(a) Target: Robust CIFAR10 Model (b) Target: Standard ImageNet Model
Figure 5: Comparison of the target loss value based seed prioritization strategy to retroactive optimal and random search strategies
(AutoZOOM baseline untargeted attack on robust CIFAR10 model and targeted attack on standard ImageNet model, averaged
over 5 runs). Solid line denotes mean value and shaded area denotes the 95% confidence interval. Maximum query budget is
1,699,998 for robust CIFAR10 model, 4,393,314 for ImageNet.
Target Model Prioritization Method Top 1% Top 2% Top 5% Top 10%
Robust
CIFAR10
(1,000 Seeds)
Retroactive Optimal 34.0±2.0 119.2±4.8 580.8±35.0 2,002±69
Target Loss 1,070±13 1,170±16 1,765±12 3,502±85
Random 25,005±108 51,325±221 130,284±561 261,883±1,128
Standard
ImageNet
(100 Seeds)
Retroactive Optimal 7,492±1,078 16,590±1,755 49,255±4,945 114,832±7,430
Target Loss 32,490±5,857 58,665±8,268 89,541±8,459 257,594±13,738
Random 22,178±705 66,532±2,114 199,595±6,341 421,365±13,387
Table 9: Comparison of the target loss value based search to retroactive optimal and random search (AutoZOOM baseline
untargeted attack on robust CIFAR10 model, targeted attack on standard ImageNet model, averaged over 5 runs). The “Top x%”
columns give the total number of queries needed to find adversarial examples for x% of the total seeds.
sults of the two black-box attacks on all the other datasets
and different combinations of target models and local models
(only for the CIFAR10 dataset) show similar patterns.
The results of seed prioritization on baseline attacks are
shown in Figure 5 and Table 9. For attacks on the robust
CIFAR10 model, performance of the target loss strategy is
much better than the random scheduling strategy. For example,
in order to obtain 1% of the total 1,000 seeds, the target loss
prioritization strategy costs 1,070 queries on average, while
the random strategy consumes on average 25,005 queries,
which is a 96% query savings. The retroactive optimal strat-
egy is very effective in this case and significantly outperforms
other strategies by only taking 34 queries. Against the Image-
Net model, however, the target loss based strategy offers little
improvement over random scheduling (Figure 5b). In contrast,
performance of the two-phase strategy is still significantly
better than random ordering.
We speculate that the difference in the performance of tar-
get loss strategy (for baseline attack) and two-phase strategy
(for hybrid attack) on ImageNet is because the baseline at-
tack starts from the original seeds, which are natural images
and ImageNet models tend to overfit to these natural images.
Therefore, the target loss value computed with respect to these
images is less helpful in predicting their actual attack cost,
which leads to poor prioritization performance. In contrast,
the hybrid attack starts from local adversarial examples, which
deviate from the natural distribution so ImageNet models are
less likely to overfit to these images. Thus, the target loss is
better correlated with the true attack cost and the prioritization
performance is also improved.
Figure 6 shows the results for the full two-phase strategy.
The seed prioritized two-phase strategy approaches the per-
formance of the (unrealizable) retroactive optimal strategy
and outperforms random scheduling strategy significantly. Ta-
ble 10 shows the number of queries needed to successfully
attack the top 1%, top 2%, top 5% and 10% of the total can-
didate seeds (1000 images for CIFAR10 and 100 images for
ImageNet). For the robust CIFAR10 target model, we observe
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(a) Target: Robust CIFAR10 Model, Local Ensemble: Normal-3 (b) Target: Standard ImageNet Model
Figure 6: Comparison of the two-phase seed prioritization strategy to retroactive optimal and random search strategies
(AutoZOOM-based hybrid attack on robust CIFAR10 model and standard ImageNet model, average over 5 runs). Solid line
denotes mean value and shaded area denotes the 95% confidence interval. Maximum query budget of attack against robust
CIFAR10 model is 1,656,818 and attack against ImageNet models is 3,029,844.
Target Model Prioritization Method Top 1% Top 2% Top 5% Top 10%
Robust
CIFAR10
(1000 Seeds)
Retroactive Optimal 10.0±0.0 20.0±0.0 50.0±0.0 107.8±17.4
Two-Phase Strategy 20.4±2.1 54.2±5.6 218.2±28.2 826.2±226.6
Random 24,054±132 49,372±270 125,327±686 251,917±137
Standard
ImageNet
(100 Seeds)
Retroactive Optimal 1.0±0.0 2.0±0.0 3,992±3,614 34,949±3,742
Two-Phase Strategy 28.0±2.0 38.6±7.5 18,351±13,175 78,844±11,837
Random 15,046±423 45,136±1,270 135,406±3,811 285,855±8045
Table 10: Comparison of the two-phase search to retroactive optimal and random search (AutoZOOM-based hybrid attack on
robust CIFAR10 model and standard ImageNet model, average over 5 runs).
that in order to obtain 10 new adversarial examples (1%),
our two-phase strategy only costs on average 20 queries (not
far off the 10 required by retroactive optimal), while random
ordering takes 20,054 queries. Similarly, for attacks on Image-
Net, obtaining the first new adversarial example (1%) using
our two-phase strategy costs in average 28 queries while ran-
dom scheduling takes in average 15,046 queries (here, the
unrealizable retroactive optimal strategy takes only a single
query since it can always find the direct transfer).
6 Conclusion
Our results improve our understanding of black-box attacks
against machine learning classifiers and show how efficiently
an attacker may be able to successfully attack even robust
target models. We propose a hybrid attack strategy, which
combines recent transfer-based and optimization-based at-
tacks. Across multiple datasets, our hybrid attack strategy
dramatically improves state-of-the-art results in terms of the
average query cost, and hence provides more accurate esti-
mation of cost of black-box adversaries. We further consider
a more practical attack setting, where the attacker has lim-
ited resources and aims to find many adversarial examples
with a fixed number of queries. We show that a simple seed
prioritization strategy can dramatically improve the overall
efficiency of hybrid attacks.
Availability
Implementations of our attacks and all of our models and
datasets are available under an open source license from (https:
//github.com/suyeecav/Hybrid-Attack).
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